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at the Pacific 
Highway Crossing
by Matthew R. Roelofs,Ph.D. 
and Mark Springer, Ph.D.INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed an increase in border security as well as continued 
growth in international truck traffic at the Pacific Highway Crossing (PHC) in Blaine, 
Washington.  As noted in a recent study, the number of commercial vehicles cross-
ing the border between British Columbia and Whatcom County, Washington, nearly 
doubled during the nineties, and nearly three-fourths of all trucks crossing this stretch 
of border are processed at PHC [1].  Congestion at PHC continues to be a concern; 
the study mentioned above found the average waiting time per southbound truck over 
a four-day period in the summer of 2002 to be about half an hour.  Recent facility 
enhancements at PHC, notably additional capacity in the form of dedicated lanes 
and inspection booths for FAST (Free and Secure Trade) participants, were aimed at 
reducing this congestion.  Other security-oriented changes, however, such as lengthier 
questioning at the inspection booths, have nonetheless increased overall processing 
times and doubled the waiting times for many trucks at the border [2].
processing capacity and a given number 
of trucks arriving at the border, U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP) could 
maximize total value across all carriers 
by more quickly processing those trucks 
for which time has a greater value.
By what means, however, could the 
CBP quickly and accurately identify 
those trucks that are most likely to ben-
efit from a shorter wait time?  A “con-
gestion pricing” option for one of the 
border freight lanes would enable those 
carriers for whom time was most criti-
cal to “purchase” time.  This would not 
mandate any slackening of the inspec-
tion process; buyers’ travel times would 
decrease because they would have access 
to a shorter line in the “pay” lane, not 
because they were receiving expedited 
Attempts have been made to quantify 
the cost of current and future waiting to 
the carriers and their supply chain part-
ners.  These studies frequently assume 
a flat hourly rate; the aforementioned 
study based the bulk of its economic 
projections on a 1995 Canadian study 
that valued driver time at forty-five 
dollars per hour (in then-current US 
dollars) for heavy trucks.  Intuitively, 
however, we know that not all carriers 
place the same value on time through-
out the day.   The value a driver and 
carrier place on time depends on the 
opportunity cost of operating the vehi-
cle, which may be affected by –  among 
other things – what the driver is haul-
ing and the schedule demands of the 
customer.  In the case of limited border 
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total carrier value is kept high, the price 
for joining the lane would change de-
pending on the relative time to be saved 
by joining it:  a long “free” line, a short 
“pay” line, or a combination of both 
would increase the price of the “pay” 
lane, while the opposite line behavior 
would lower the price.
This study investigates the possibili-
ties of providing a congestion pricing 
option for freight crossing from Canada 
into the U.S.  We first review current 
theory and practice with regards to con-
gestion pricing for transportation facili-
ties.  Next, we introduce the “test case” 
for our study:  the southbound Pacific 
Highway Crossing for freight.  We pro-
vide an overview of current PHC opera-
tions and discuss the simulation model 
and methodology used to investigate 
two alternatives for implementation of 
congestion pricing at PHC.   The fol-
lowing section summarizes the results 
of our experiments, investigating the 
costs, benefits, and feasibility of intro-
ducing some form of congestion pric-
ing at the commercial PHC.   Finally, 
we conclude with a set of general policy 
recommendations. 
CONGESTION PRICING  
FOR TRANSPORTATION:  
CURRENT PRACTICE
Most existing applications of conges-
tion pricing in transportation are with 
regards to roadways and, to a lesser ex-
tent, bridges.  Charging motorists a toll 
for the use of transportation facilities is 
not new; the Pennsylvania Turnpike has 
been operating since 1940. In this tradi-
tional pricing approach, all users driving 
the same type of vehicle for the same 
distance pay the same amount, regard-
less of the road conditions or time of 
day.  The primary objective of this non-
variable pricing strategy is simply rais-
ing revenue.  In contrast, a variable or 
congestion-based pricing strategy aims 
not solely to raise revenue, but to also 
achieve more effective use of transpor-
tation facilities by “managing demand” 
and “rationing supply.”  In such a strat-
egy, tolls are designed to vary along 
with demand for the facilities; due to 
these price differentials, some motorists 
are therefore encouraged to “time-shift” 
their travel demand to non-peak hours, 
and scarce rush hour capacity is effec-
tively allocated to those motorists who 
place the greatest value on travel.  
Since traffic demand patterns are 
somewhat predictable, one approach 
to congestion pricing has been to de-
termine a time-based schedule, in ad-
vance, which specifies how rates change 
throughout the day.  The State Route 91 
(SR91) Express Lanes in Orange County, 
California, are a good and relatively so-
phisticated example of this approach. 
Tolls along this ten-mile stretch of road 
have a published schedule which is peri-
odically updated, but generally remains 
3
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advantage of this approach for users is 
price predictability. However, a potential 
downside is that road conditions may 
not correlate to the published schedule. 
Unpredicted changes in demand and 
roadway capacity can lead to a conges-
tion pattern that is disconnected from 
the pricing schedule.  Nevertheless, 
most congestion-pricing schemes for 
transportation facilities are time-based.  
Dynamic pricing attempts to close 
the feedback loop between demand and 
price; prices are frequently updated, 
based on user demand, to maintain a 
specified level of service.  California’s 
I-15 Value Pricing Project, in which 
underutilized HOV (high-occupancy 
vehicle) lanes were opened to single-oc-
cupancy vehicles (SOV) for a congestion-
based fee, was an early implementation 
of dynamic pricing. Traffic counts in the 
newly-renamed “HOT” (high occupan-
cy/toll) lanes on I-15 were calculated for 
every six minute interval, and per-trip 
prices were adjusted based on this de-
mand information; prices were adjusted 
to maintain a “level of service” (LOS) of 
C or better; which implies busy but rela-
tively free flowing traffic.  A toll sched-
ule is published for the I-15 HOT lanes, 
but all of the tolls listed are simply esti-
mates, and HOT lane management may 
override the published maximum toll.  
It should be emphasized that conges-
tion pricing on I-15 also differs from 
that on SR91 in that the I-15 express 
lanes contain a mix of users:  HOV 
carpoolers and toll-paying (SOV) driv-
ers.  A key element to making the I-15 
HOT lanes successful was therefore the 
existence of excess capacity in the pre-
conversion HOV lanes; also, maintain-
ing free-flowing traffic on the new HOT 
lanes is politically necessary not only to 
give paying SOV drivers a sense of “val-
ue,” but also to continue to encourage 
carpooling behavior by the public. 
CONGESTION PRICING  
FOR TRANSPORTATION:  
CURRENT THEORY
The literature related to congestion 
pricing is voluminous and includes 
contributions by economists, engineers, 
and operations researchers.  The theme 
that runs through all of this work is 
that when users of a transportation 
network impose costs on one another, 
private consumption of the transporta-
tion good will deviate from the social 
optimum, with a higher-than-optimal 
quantity consumed (i.e., too much traf-
fic).  The goal of any approach to pric-
ing these goods is to force individuals 
to internalize the external cost they im-
pose on other users and thus drive the 
interaction towards the social optimum. 
Note that this does not mean there will 
be no congestion, but rather an ‘opti-
mal’ amount of congestion, an amount 
of traffic/congestion that correctly and 
completely balances the internal and 
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that particular network at a particular 
time.
In Figure 1 below, we consider a sim-
ple theoretical scenario of a single link 
roadway – one origin, one destination, 
one path.  We assume that the road us-
ers are homogeneous and have a com-
bined inverse demand for travel given 
by D(q), where q is the amount of trans-
portation good consumed.  In this sim-
ple example, q would be the number of 
trips made along the roadway per day. 
The demand function derives from the 
value each user places on making the 
trip; as the “price” of making the trip 
increases, the number of trips demand-
ed declines.  In addition, each user in-
curs costs associated with the trip that 
include the obvious items such as fuel 
and vehicle depreciation as well as the 
dollar value of the time used to make 
the trip.  These costs are assumed to be 
constant and identical for all users up 
to the point where the road becomes 
congested.  
 Figure 1. Optimal Toll for Single Link Roadway
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ers down, both the time cost and the 
vehicle costs begin to increase as more 
users crowd the roadway.  In addition, 
the portion of these costs borne by an 
individual driver and the total cost of 
that driver using the road begin to di-
verge.  We call the costs paid by the 
driver her marginal private cost (MPC) 
and the full cost imposed – private cost 
plus any external costs imposed on 
other drivers – the marginal social cost 
(MSC).  An alternative interpretation is 
to note that a given driver pays only the 
average cost of her road use and not the 
full marginal cost.
A quantity of road use between 0 and 
q1 corresponds to the case where the 
roadway still has excess capacity.  Once 
traffic levels rise above q1 the roadway 
becomes congested and the MPC and 
MSC both begin to increase, with the 
steeper rise in MSC reflecting the cost 
of congestion.  With free access to the 
roadway, the equilibrium level of traf-
fic will be point q2.  Unfortunately, at 
this level of traffic, the MSC exceeds 
the marginal benefit of road use, as 
measured by the demand curve, by the 
amount [a-c].  In contrast, the socially 
optimal level of consumption is q3 with 
price b.  The congestion tax or toll is 
used to move the market from q2 to q3 
by imposing a toll that is equal to the 
difference between the MSC and MPC 
that maximizes social benefit, which in 
this example means the toll is set equal 
to [b-c].
Our problem differs from this simple 
scenario in three ways.  First, both of 
the situations we investigate leave at 
least one lane untolled.1   This places 
our problem in the class of problems 
economists refer to as “second-best,” in 
contrast to a first-best solution, which 
is one in which all lanes are tolled [3]. 
Second, our model does not allow for 
the possibility that use of the border 
crossing will decline in the face of in-
creased user cost; rather we simply 
present a toll as a way to manage the 
current level of usage and better uti-
lize the facilities.  Third, at the border 
there is a much smaller range of traffic 
for which congestion is zero; essential-
ly, congestion begins any time there is 
more than one truck in the queue, so 
the divergence between MPC and MSC 
occurs immediately. In all three of these 
cases, the efficiency gains from tolling 
are smaller than in the theoretical case 
presented above.
While these results provide an im-
portant theoretical foundation for 
understanding the rationale behind 
congestion pricing, current practice – as 
discussed in the previous section – does 
not necessarily set tolls at the social 
optimum.  There are several practical 
difficulties with directly applying the 
optimal formulae in a dynamic frame-
work.   For example, the inter-arrival and 
service time distributions are unlikely 
to remain unchanged long enough to 
1This is sometimes 
referred to as “value 
pricing” and is a 
particularly palatable 
option from a political 
perspective since it gives 
users the option to avoid 
the toll.
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mal value.  In addition, the algorithms 
necessary to determine the optimal toll 
may require dramatic jumps in the toll 
charged to users, which is likely to lead 
to user dissatisfaction.  Practical appli-
cations of dynamic pricing are therefore 
likely to use heuristic toll-setting algo-
rithms which increase, but do not nec-
essarily maximize, economic efficiency.
CURRENT BORDER  
OPERATIONS
While we are interested in the gen-
eral applicability of congestion pricing 
at any border crossing, a specific ex-
ample – the southbound Pacific High-
way commercial border crossing – was 
chosen to probe the issues discussed in 
the previous sections.  Relying on on-
site observation and data collection, we 
constructed a simulation model of the 
crossing as it currently exists, and then 
gauged its performance under a range of 
congestion pricing options.  
There are currently three booths for 
the general inspection of trucks as they 
arrive at PHC.   One of these booths is 
restricted to trucks enrolled in the Free 
and Secure Trade, or FAST, program co-
implemented by Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico; trucks not enrolled 
in FAST are restricted to the other two 
booths.  The FAST program, which re-
quires the carrier, driver, and importer 
to be registered participants of FAST, fo-
cuses on providing certification to “low 
risk” participants.  Since the wait times 
at the FAST booth are significantly short-
er than at the general-purpose booths, 
FAST participants – who have taken 
additional steps and have  therefore in-
curred additional costs to enhance U.S. 
security – are effectively rewarded for 
their efforts with a shorter wait time.
Our model incorporates approximate-
ly sixteen hundred linear meters of the 
approach to the border.  For twelve hun-
dred meters of this approach, non-FAST 
trucks are restricted to the curb lane; 
during the remaining four-hundred-
meter approach, these same trucks are 
routed through a series of lane splitting 
and re-merging before being directed 
into two lanes approaching the general-
purpose booths.  FAST traffic bypasses 
any queued non-FAST trucks in a pass-
ing lane that is shared with non-truck 
traffic; four hundred meters from the 
border, the remaining non-truck traf-
fic splits off to a separate lane and FAST 
trucks continue on a lane dedicated for 
their use.  
To validate and calibrate the simula-
tion model constructed to represent 
the traffic flow described above, we ob-
tained data from a comprehensive sur-
vey of inter-arrival times, service times, 
and queue lengths conducted over four 
nine-hour days in June 2006 [4].  For 
each hour of each of the four days for 
which data were available, probability 
distributions were fitted to the recorded 
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eters were then used as input to simu-
late each of the four days.  Each day was 
simulated thirty times with different 
random number seeds, and the mean 
and standard deviation of the hourly 
queue lengths for non-FAST trucks (the 
only queue length recorded by the sur-
vey) were calculated.   With few excep-
tions, the observed mean hourly queue 
lengths were well within the expected 
range of queue lengths generated by the 
simulation; we therefore considered the 
simulation model of the current border 
configuration to be valid. 
FUTURE BORDER OPERATIONS
While there are many possible lane 
configurations consistent with a con-
gestion pricing implementation at the 
border, we focused on two possibilities 
which require minimal infrastructure 
changes.  The first scenario involves the 
conversion of the current FAST lane to 
a combined FAST/pay lane; this would 
leave two general-purpose “free” lanes 
for all other freight traffic.  The second 
scenario would leave the FAST lane 
unchanged, but would convert a cur-
rent general-purpose lane to a toll lane. 
Under both scenarios, trucks unable or 
unwilling to enroll in FAST would still 
have the option to pay for a shorter wait 
time.    
Due to the improved responsive-
ness of a dynamic pricing system rela-
tive to a time-based pricing system, we 
only considered dynamic pricing.  This 
would require continuously-updated 
information boards on the approach to 
the border stations listing the following 
information:  the expected wait time for 
each type of lane, and the current price 
per vehicle for joining the toll lane.  This 
information board should be available 
to trucks no later then the beginning of 
the sixteen-hundred-meter approach to 
the border.  Under the combined FAST/
toll scenario, no lane reconfiguration 
is necessary; both FAST and non-FAST 
toll-paying trucks would simply follow 
the route now taken by the FAST trucks. 
The information board would display 
two wait times – one for the two “free” 
lanes and one for the FAST/toll lane – 
and one toll price.
For the dedicated toll lane scenario, 
some degree of lane reconfiguration 
would be necessary.  There are multiple 
ways to reconfigure the transition points 
for three distinct lanes; the reconfigura-
tion considered here tries to minimize 
the physical changes necessary.  The 
remaining general-purpose lane would 
retain its current configuration for the 
first twelve hundred meters, but would 
now feed only one lane rather than two 
lanes for the remaining four-hundred-
meter approach to the border.  Paying 
trucks as well as FAST trucks would 
follow the current FAST path for the 
first twelve hundred meters, and then 
branch off into separate lanes for the re-
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A method for collecting tolls would 
be necessary for both scenarios.  While 
manual toll collection remains an op-
tion at many tolled transportation fa-
cilities, the preferred current collection 
method requires each tolled vehicle to 
establish an account with the tolling 
agency and to carry a transponder in 
the vehicle; when the vehicle enters the 
tolled facility, the transponder relays 
an electronic signal and the user is au-
tomatically charged.  For many conges-
tion pricing systems, such as the HOT 
lanes referred to earlier, this is the only 
payment option available.  Since no 
physical transaction is required, service 
times are not increased and the process 
of collecting the toll does not add to the 
existing congestion.  This method does 
require users to decide in advance, by 
registering, that they might want to use 
the tolled facilities, but they can post-
pone the final decision on a particular 
trip until they approach the border.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Three different border configurations 
were therefore examined for the simula-
tion study:  the current configuration, a 
configuration with two general-purpose 
lanes and a shared FAST/toll lane, and a 
configuration with one general-purpose 
lane and separate FAST and toll lanes. 
Each of the latter two scenarios used a 
simple toll-updating algorithm concep-
tually similar to the one originally de-
vised for the I-15 HOT lanes.  Just as the 
I-15 HOT lanes adjusted tolls to encour-
age efficient use of the HOT lanes but 
also to ensure that travel conditions did 
not deteriorate below a specified level of 
service, border tolls are set to minimize 
the probability that the waiting time for 
trucks in the shared or separate toll lane 
would exceed a specified target waiting 
time.  Simply put, if the expected wait 
for an arriving truck – which is itself a 
factor of the current queue length, es-
timated service rate, and current esti-
mated arrival rate – exceeds the target 
wait by a certain threshold, the toll is 
increased by a specified increment; if 
it is below the target wait by the same 
threshold, the toll is decreased by the 
same amount. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the tolling 
algorithm works for one simulated day 
in the shared FAST/toll lane scenario. 
Both the current toll and the actual cost 
of waiting for each user of the shared 
FAST/toll lane are plotted on the graph 
as a function of time; the dark vertical 
bars each represent an instance where a 
non-FAST enrolled trucker paid the toll 
to join the shared FAST/toll lane.  Since, 
for this example, the cost of waiting per 
hour was fixed to two hundred dollars 
per hour for all users, the waiting cost is 
a perfect stand-in for waiting time. Prior 
to 8:00 a.m. – time zero on the graph – a 
buildup of truckers in the FAST lane has 
increased the toll and effectively “priced 
9
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As the FAST queue declines and the wait 
time decreases, the toll drops as well un-
til several non-FAST enrolled truckers 
opt for the FAST lane.  Eventually, this 
leads to an increase in wait time and the 
toll, which once again shuts out non-
FAST enrollees.  Over the course of the 
day, the actual wait rarely exceeds the 
target maximum wait of sixty minutes 
(two hundred dollars in waiting cost), 
as the toll effectively regulates non-FAST 
arrivals to the shared FAST/toll lane.
Parameters affecting the pricing algo-
rithm’s performance include the time 
interval for updating; the desired maxi-
mum target waiting time for trucks in 
the shared or separate toll lane, and the 
desired maximum probability of exceed-
ing that wait; the incremental amount 
for increasing or decreasing the toll; the 
threshold difference required for updat-
ing the toll; and the method used to es-
timate the future expected wait.  Several 
of the parameters control the speed with 
which the tolls are changed; a more rap-
idly changing toll may therefore more 
accurately reflect the current state of 
the system, but may also be more likely 
to antagonize users.
To measure the performance of the 
current configuration and the two pro-
posed alternatives, we focused on the 
average cost per user per day, where cost 
Figure 2.  Toll and Cost of Waiting for Shared FAST/Toll Lane Over Time
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the cost of any toll paid by that user. 
The cost of waiting was based on the 
total waiting time experienced by the 
truck and the hourly cost of time as-
signed to the truck at the beginning of 
the simulation.  In the border configu-
rations with a tolling option, trucks ap-
proaching the border are informed via 
an electronic signboard of the toll price 
and the expected waiting times in both 
the general-purpose lane(s) and the 
tolled lane.  Drivers are assumed to be 
rational, in that they choose to pay the 
toll if their expected total cost after pay-
ing the toll is less than their expected 
cost of waiting in the general-purpose 
lane(s).  
Each run of the simulation covered a 
single eleven-hour day.   For each day, 
the period of interest was the nine-hour 
stretch from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., 
the period for which survey data were 
available to calibrate the model; the two 
hours prior to this were used simply to 
initialize the queues and toll-setting al-
gorithm, and the data collected during 
this initialization phase were discarded. 
Inter-arrival and service time distribu-
tions were based upon an “average” day 
as evidenced by the survey data.   Envi-
ronmental parameters which were var-
ied from day to day included an “arrival 
factor” which, when applied as a multi-
plier to the mean arrival rates through-
out the day, could be used to model 
slow or busy days; the fraction of arriv-
ing trucks enrolled in FAST; the fraction 
of arriving trucks which were classified 
as “heavy” and therefore took long 
to move through the radiation portal 
monitors; the fraction of trucks parking 
to conduct business prior to crossing 
the border; the average hourly cost of 
time for a truck; and the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of the hourly cost of time 
for arriving trucks.
Two separate analyses were conduct-
ed; one comparing the current con-
figuration to the shared FAST/toll lane 
scenario, and the second comparing 
the current configuration to the sepa-
rate FAST and toll lane scenario.  Each 
analysis took place in two stages.  Ex-
periments in the first stage were used 
to identify those environmental param-
eters which impacted the relative per-
formance of the tolling scenario under 
consideration; during the experimental 
runs, each environmental parameter was 
set at either a high or low level which 
enclosed the actual levels observed dur-
ing the four-day data survey.  Critical 
parameters identified in this stage were 
then included in the second experiment 
for each scenario; these experiments fo-
cused on the impact of the algorithmic 
parameters on system performance.  
Table 1 shows the high and low set-
tings used for the environmental and 
algorithmic parameters varied in the 
experiments.  For average dollar value 
of time, the wide range chosen repre-
sents the range of estimates obtained 






Other sources give slightly 
lower estimates; a 2003 
Oregon DOT publica-
tion suggess $30.43/hour 
and a 2003 revision of 
a 1997 US DOT report 
estimates $18.01.  The 
higher Caltrans estimate 
is explained by the inclu-
sion of an adjustment for 
the time cost of freight in 
addition to the time value 
of the driver.
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remaining environmental parameters 
the range defined by the low and high 
settings was meant to enclose the values 
observed during the four-day data sur-
vey; for the algorithmic parameters, the 
settings were chosen based on existing 
algorithms and the results of prelimi-
nary simulation runs.
Table 1.  Experimental Parameters
Environmental Parameters




% FAST 25% 35%
% Heavy 68% 88%
% Parking 5% 10%
Avg $/Hour $50 $200
CV $/Hour 0.05 0.25
Algorithmic Parameters




















It should be noted that two key en-
vironmental parameters were set such 
that their high value coincided with 
the observed average values:  the arrival 
factor and the percentage of  FAST en-
rollees.  An arrival factor of one yields 
a daily arrival profile equal to that of 
an “average” day, while thirty-five per-
cent represents the average fraction of 
FAST enrollees observed during the data 
survey.  The high levels of these param-
eters were set to their average observed 
values in order to ensure the stability of 
all simulated days; either higher overall 
arrival rates or a higher overall percent-
age of FAST enrollees would overwhelm 
the FAST lane as trucks arrived faster 
than they could be processed.  Thus, 
although wait times in the FAST lane 
are currently much shorter than in the 
general-purpose lanes (wait times in the 
FAST lane are generally a half hour or 
less, while those in the general-purpose 
lanes average well over an hour and can 
easily exceed two hours), the FAST lanes 
are currently operating close to capac-
ity.  A small increase in either parameter 
resulting in an increase in FAST lane 
arrivals would, without further mitiga-
tion, yield a dramatic increase in FAST 
waiting time during the peak arrival 
time of the day.  To ensure that all sim-
ulated days were stable, therefore, the 
high level of each parameter was set at 
its current average value.
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
The first stage of the experiment, 
which focused on the impact of envi-
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alternate tolling scenarios, showed that, 
in terms of total cost per truck, there was 
indeed a significant difference between 
the current configuration and the two 
tolling scenarios.  Total cost per truck, 
which averaged $115 across all trucks 
in the current configuration, dropped 
to $99 in the shared FAST/toll lane con-
figuration, but rose to $247 in the sepa-
rate FAST/toll lanes scenario.  Summary 
results showing the total cost per truck 
and other daily performance measures 
are provided in Table 2.
Key to understanding these results is 
realizing that in the shared FAST/toll 
lane scenario, a small amount of excess 
capacity – as defined by the target maxi-
mum wait – is being made available to 
non-FAST participants.  The amount 
of capacity being made available is not 
large; as mentioned earlier, the FAST lane 
is operating just below that level of ca-
pacity where the waiting time begins to 
increase dramatically.  Since in this first 
experiment the toll is adjusted to en-
sure FAST participants a maximum wait 
of forty-five minutes, only six percent 
of the non-FAST participants choose to 
pay the toll and join the FAST/toll lane. 
Thus the average wait time (and wait-
ing cost) of FAST participants goes up 
slightly but remains small, while the av-
erage wait time and cost of all non-FAST 
participants declines: those choosing 
to pay the toll experience significantly 
Table 2.  Performance of Alternative Border Scenarios
BordEr ScEnArio
Quantity







Average Waiting Cost/Truck 115.02 95.26 162.36
Average Toll/Paying Truck  0.00 65.62 270.41
Average Total Cost/Truck 115.02 99.50 246.51
FAST Participants
   Average Wait/Truck (min) 2.81 7.03 2.68
   Average Waiting Cost/Truck 7.30 17.27 7.57
Non-FAST Participants
   Average Wait/Truck (min) 77.99 60.09 113.90
   Average Waiting Cost/Truck 160.61 129.47 233.36
   Average Total Cost/Truck 160.61 135.08 355.96
   Average Total Toll Revenue 0.00 3,428.45 45,902.60
   Average % Choosing Toll 0.00% 5.97% 44.22%
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ing not to pay have fewer trucks in front 
of them and also see their wait time and 
cost decrease.  Since the decline in non-
FAST waiting cost is more than the toll 
paid averaged over all FAST participants, 
the total cost per non-FAST participant 
declines by nearly twenty-five dollars, 
which more than cancels out the ten 
dollar increase in cost experienced by 
the smaller number of FAST users.  
In moving from the current configu-
ration to the separate FAST/toll lanes 
scenario, on the other hand, capacity 
is effectively removed from the border 
crossing since the toll is regulated to 
ensure a maximum waiting time; when 
the likely waiting time exceeds the tar-
get amount, the toll increases until ar-
rivals are discouraged from joining the 
tolled lane.  Thus only slightly more 
than forty-four percent of non-FAST 
participants choose to join the tolled 
lane, rather than the fifty percent ex-
pected to join each non-FAST lane if 
no toll were charged.  While it may 
seem that a 44/56 split of all non-FAST 
participants between two lanes would 
not yield much of an average waiting 
time difference from the 50/50 split 
of the same trucks in the non-tolled 
scenario, elementary queueing theory 
does indeed show that such an uneven 
split will increase average waiting time 
across both lanes, especially as the sys-
tem approaches capacity:  the decrease 
in waiting time experienced by those in 
the tolled lane will be more than offset 
Figure 3.  Interaction Between Tolling Option and FAST Enrollment
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the remaining general-purpose lane. 
Compounding the difficulty for non-
FAST enrollees, the half that choose to 
pay the toll incur an even higher total 
cost.  Since there is so much additional 
waiting for non-FAST enrolled trucks, 
especially in the general-purpose lane, 
the toll – which is meant to capture the 
cost of waiting imposed on others – is 
much higher than in the shared FAST/
toll lane scenario.
 Furthermore, analysis of the interac-
tions between the environmental pa-
rameters and the choice of the tolling 
scenario revealed a significant interac-
tion between the use of each tolling 
scenario and certain environmental pa-
rameters.  For the shared FAST/toll lane 
scenario, total cost per truck decreased 
by nearly fifty dollars in switching from 
the current configuration to the tolled 
scenario when FAST enrollment was 
low, but increased by over fifteen dol-
lars when enrollment was high (Figure 
3).  Thus the gains noted above for the 
shared FAST/toll scenario over the cur-
rent configuration are only evident 
when FAST enrollment is low and there 
is spare capacity in the FAST lane; at 
the current enrollment rate for FAST at 
PHC, a lack of excess capacity leads to a 
slight increase in total cost as non-FAST 
participants pay to join the FAST lane.
For the separate FAST/toll lanes sce-
nario, the overall arrival rate signifi-
cantly impacts the relative performance 
of the tolled option; while the average 
 Figure 4.  Interaction Between Tolling Option and Arrival Rate
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moving from the current configuration 
to the tolled scenario, that increase is 
fifty percent greater at current arrival 
rates than at a setting equal to eighty 
percent of the current values (Figure 4). 
As with the shared FAST/toll option, the 
separate FAST/toll lane option appears 
more palatable in a less-congested sys-
tem than currently exists at the PHC.
The second stage of the analysis, 
which looked at the impact of algorith-
mic parameters on the performance of 
each tolling scenario, yielded, for the 
most part, expected results (Figure 5). 
For both tolled scenarios, the target 
maximum waiting time was a signifi-
cant factor; lowering the target maxi-
mum wait from sixty to thirty minutes 
priced out many potential toll-paying 
users and raised the average cost per 
truck for both tolled scenarios.  Increas-
ing the time interval for updating the 
toll from one to six minutes, also, on 
average, significantly increased the av-
erage total cost per truck.  As expected, 
frequent updates allow a closer match 
between the toll being charged and the 
current border status, thus helping to 
maximize the effectiveness of both toll-
ing systems.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary conclusion from our 
analysis is the importance of capacity 
in any politically acceptable congestion 
Figure 5.  Impact of Algorithmic Parameters on Increasing Average Cost
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capacity in the FAST lane is converted 
to usable space via a toll, performance 
measures for the system improve.  Cur-
rent usage of the FAST lane, however, 
leaves little excess capacity for toll-pay-
ing non-FAST participants, and given 
that FAST enrollment is encouraged 
by the CBP and may be expected to in-
crease, implementing a toll via a shared 
FAST/toll lane is unlikely to offer much 
advantage for toll-paying trucks or to 
lower the average cost experienced by all 
trucks.  Furthermore, in the case where 
the limited excess FAST lane capacity 
is not tapped and one of the two cur-
rent general-purpose lanes is converted 
into a toll lane, performance of the sys-
tem—as measured by the waiting and 
tolling cost per truck—degrades across 
all likely parameter combinations.   
Two possible carrier reactions to a 
toll, neither of which is considered in 
this analysis, could improve a toll’s rel-
ative performance.  The current analy-
sis assumes that the number of trucks 
crossing the border and their arrival 
pattern remains unchanged regard-
less of the tolling scenario; it also as-
sumes that tolling does not encourage 
users to either abandon or adopt FAST 
enrollment.  Analyzing the impact 
of relaxing either or both of these as-
sumptions, which would require fur-
ther detailed knowledge of the carriers’ 
demand functions, could increase the 
relative performance of either or both 
tolling scenarios.  
In general, however, the results report-
ed here mimic current experience with 
congestion pricing plans and implemen-
tations across the country.  The plans 
most likely to successfully move beyond 
the planning stage have been those that 
have made additional capacity available 
for a fee; both SR91, where new express 
lanes were tolled from the beginning of 
their construction, and I-15, where ex-
cess capacity was opened to paying us-
ers on an underutilized HOV lane, took 
this approach.  Attempts to charge for 
currently “free” transportation resourc-
es without a corresponding increase in 
capacity have rarely progressed beyond 
the planning stage in the United States. 
Given the absence of much excess ca-
pacity in the FAST lane at PHC, a tolled 
lane does not seem to be a viable option 
if a key performance measure is the av-
erage cost born by all users.  A possible 
third alternative, not considered here 
because of the infrastructure require-
ments, would be to open a fourth booth 
exclusively for tolling.  Indeed, given 
the current high utilization and likely 
continued increase in cross-border traf-
fic, some further increase in PHC capac-
ity is likely to be warranted in the near 
future; adding a tolled option in the 
form of a fourth booth should certainly 
be one of the scenarios examined when 
additional capacity is considered.
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